Thirty-year Treasuries: 55 days above 5%, most since 2006

Archived reading, published Tue, 01 Sep 2026 10:17:27 UTC (20 days ago). This is not the current state of the meter.

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CRASH-O-METER

Cracking

how close are we

Fragility92

how much tinder is stacked up — moves slowly

Ignition35

how close a spark is — moves fast

Crash Lab watches the machinery under the current boom: the debt paying for AI data centres, private credit, the leverage that has moved out of banks into places nobody has to mark, the bond market and the dollar.

Every four hours it reads the day’s reporting from 16 sources and rewrites this page.

Status: Held at 64. This is the fourth run on the same 31 August equity close — S&P 1.4% off its high, high yield 260bp, VIX up to 15.86 from 14.92 but still low — and the window's reporting is overwhelmingly the same AI-debt and BDC numbers arriving from new outlets, so ignition stays at 35. Fragility holds at 92: the one genuinely new tier-1 fact (the 30-year has closed above 5% on 55 days, the most since 2006) is a sharper measure of a strain we already carry, and it is offset by a real improvement — bank card delinquencies fell to 2.85% from 3.04% a year earlier.

Reporting from 30 Aug to 1 Sep

Crash points

Eight places it could go, scored 0–10. Tap one for the explainer.

What’s moving the needle

What changed in the last few hours, and what each one says about the plumbing.

Bond market dysfunction1 Sephigh

Fifty-five days above five percent

A long end that stays above 5% quietly re-underwrites every asset priced off it, whether or not anyone remarks the book.

The yield on the 30-year Treasury has now settled above 5% on 55 days since the start of January — the most in any year since 2006, on Bloomberg's data. It touched 5.34% in mid-August, the highest since 2007 and within 10 basis points of a 22-year high, and sat at 5.27% on Tuesday (Bloomberg). The important word in that sentence is days. A yield spike is a headline; a yield that stays there is a repricing. Every private-credit loan, every data-centre lease, every leveraged buyout underwritten when the long end was at 4% is now being discounted against a curve that has held near 5.3% for most of a year. Treasury's response was to double its long-end liquidity-support buybacks, from $2bn to at least $4bn per operation in the 10–20 and 20–30 year sectors, running 9 September to 4 November. Worth being precise about what that is: the Treasury buys old, illiquid off-the-run bonds and funds the purchases with new issuance, generally bills. It does not reduce the debt. It swaps duration the market does not want for paper it does, and shifts supply toward the front end. Announced on 19 August, it moved yields for minutes; they had round-tripped by the following afternoon. What is not happening matters as much. The WSJ's own summary of the episode: no failed auctions, no dealer balance-sheet seizure, no forced unwinds, nothing resembling March 2020 or the gilt market in 2022. This is price pressure from deficits and supply, met with an official patch. It is a fragility story, not yet an ignition one.

Private credit and BDCs1 Sephigh

The gates now have names

Redemption limits spreading to funds without exposure is how a credit problem becomes a liquidity problem.

Australia's private credit gating has moved from anecdote to named funds. MA Financial has imposed a temporary redemption limit of up to 1% of funds under management per month. CVS Lane has reportedly suspended processing of both application and redemption requests across its funds. The trigger was the A$2.3bn collapse of Sydney builder Bathla Group — and, as Bloomberg reported, one of the funds restricting withdrawals has no exposure to Bathla at all. A gate is not a default. It is the opposite of one: it stops a fund having to sell illiquid loans into a bid that does not exist, which protects the remaining investors and the marks. What it does to the investor who wanted their money is a different question, and what it does to the next investor deciding whether to commit is a different question again. Gates travel by reputation, not by exposure. That is why a fund with no Bathla loans restricted withdrawals anyway. The US numbers behind the same asset class keep hardening. Jefferies has Q2 non-accruals at Blackstone Secured Lending at 3.6%, against 0.3% in Q1 2025; Golub at 2.9%, Blue Owl at 2.8%, Ares Capital at 2.4% — the highest at these funds since at least 2021. Across the ten largest BDCs, non-accruals reached 3.95% of cost. Across 83 funds, investments still held were written down by $2.04bn in the quarter, the largest quarterly write-down in a thirteen-quarter dataset. The listed vehicles disagree, loudly. Blackstone Secured Lending is 0.1% off its recent high. FS KKR is up 11.8% over twenty days, Blue Owl's manager up 11.7%, its BDC up 4.9%. Either the write-downs are already in the price, or the price has not been asked the question.

The AI capex bubble31 Augmedium

Two incompatible descriptions of Nvidia's $500bn

Whether the AI build-out is financed on Nvidia's balance sheet or on everyone else's determines who is forced to sell when the returns disappoint.

Andrew Bailey, writing to G20 finance ministers as chair of the Financial Stability Board, warned that debt used to fund the AI build-out "could amplify a future market correction". His concern was not leverage alone: "the issue is not simply that investors are borrowing more but that leverage is interacting with high valuations and market concentration." In setting that up, the Telegraph writes that Nvidia, worth more than $5.2tn, "recently raised $500bn from a consortium of US banks and investors to fund its AI investment spree" (Telegraph). CNBC's account of the same $500bn, carried in our sweep, describes something structurally different: Nvidia partnering with Wall Street firms to establish financing platforms to mobilise $500bn of third-party capital for AI infrastructure. Those are not the same claim. One is half a trillion dollars of Nvidia's own funding. The other is half a trillion dollars of other people's money, arranged by Nvidia, to buy Nvidia's products — which would sit on the balance sheets of neoclouds, SPVs and private credit funds, not Nvidia's. The first is a company levering up. The second is a vendor organising the credit that clears its inventory, with the losses landing somewhere nobody has to mark daily. We cannot reconcile the two figures from what has been published. The distinction is the whole Crash Lab thesis in one number. It is also not academic: Nvidia disclosed in an 8-K on 17 August residual value guarantees with SB Energy covering roughly 4.25GW of IT load, with the aggregate payment obligation capped at $105bn. That is a contingent liability, not a borrowing, and it is exactly the kind of exposure the headline number obscures. The market is untroubled. Nvidia rose 5.9% on the week and sits 3.2% below its high.

Hidden leverage and shadow banking31 Auglow

Treasury repo is drifting back out of clearing

The largest leveraged position in the financial system is financed in a market that is getting less transparent, not more.

One number in this window's leverage sweep deserves more attention than it got: the share of Treasury repo that is centrally cleared fell from 71% at the end of 2025 to 62% in the first quarter of 2026. Why that matters takes a paragraph of plumbing. In a repo, a hedge fund borrows cash against Treasuries. Centrally cleared, both legs face a clearing house, which nets exposures across all its members, demands margin to a published schedule, and knows the size of the position. Bilaterally, the trade sits between the fund and a single dealer, on terms nobody else sees — and a meaningful share of bilateral Treasury repo has historically been done at zero haircut, meaning the borrower posts no cushion at all. The SEC's clearing mandate exists precisely to move this activity into the light. The share moving the other way, if the number holds, is a step backwards. It matters because of what the repo is funding. Analysts recirculating Federal Reserve estimates put large hedge funds' gross Treasury exposure at about $4tn — $2.4tn long, $1.6tn short — financed by roughly $3tn of repo borrowing, with 90% of that borrowing concentrated in the 50 largest funds. Within it, the cash-futures basis trade is sized at about $830bn, close to double its early-2020 peak, plus $305bn of swap-spread arbitrage. The mechanism to fear is not credit loss. It is that a move in yields triggers margin calls, funds sell Treasuries to meet them, yields move further, and the loop closes. That is roughly what happened in March 2020, at a fraction of today's size. Treat the clearing figure carefully: it comes from market commentary in a single sweep, not from an official release, and we have not seen it corroborated.

Household credit31 Aughigh

Subprime auto at a record, credit cards getting better

Losses concentrated in the bottom score bands do not threaten a bank, but they are the collateral behind a large stock of auto ABS.

Household credit is not deteriorating. Parts of it are. Fitch has subprime auto delinquencies at 6.13% in July, up from 5.80% at midyear. Prime borrowers, in the same series, are at 0.49%, up one basis point. New York Fed data for the second quarter shows 5.49% of all auto loan balances at least 90 days delinquent — the second-highest reading in more than twenty years — with 3.0% of balances migrating into that bucket over the past four quarters. Equifax, summarising Moody's, describes subprime auto borrowers as at an all-time high for delinquency. At the same time, cards improved. Commercial bank card delinquencies fell to 2.85% in Q2 from 3.04% a year earlier; the broader measure including private-label and subprime cards fell to 2.69% from 2.87%. FICO's 30-day auto measure ticked down to 2.6%. The average US FICO score held at 714. The reconciliation is in the distribution, not the average. FICO says subsequent 90-plus-day delinquency rates on mortgages and autos rose only in the lowest score bands and were flat everywhere else. Layer on student loans: about 3.2 million borrowers with a payment due were reported delinquent, and they lost an average 38 FICO points year-on-year, while borrowers with no recent delinquency gained 16. So one cohort is being pushed down the score ladder — which raises the price of everything they borrow next — while the aggregate looks fine. That is a slow, compounding problem rather than a spark. The equity market has picked its side. Credit Acceptance, the deep-subprime auto lender, sits 0.36% off its recent high and is up 5.1% over twenty days. Ally, the prime-to-subprime auto lender, is down 4.2%.

Crypto and TradFi contagion31 Aughigh

Strategy raised more equity than it spent on bitcoin

The premium to net asset value is the entire financing model of the treasury companies, and it is the fastest-moving number in this beat.

Strategy bought $369.7m of bitcoin in the week to 30 August, ending a ten-week pause. The interesting part is the funding. It raised $602.8m through common stock sales and bought back $151.8m of preferred shares (Bloomberg). So the company issued roughly $233m more equity than it put into coin, and used part of the difference to retire preferred stock — the instrument that carries a fixed claim ahead of common holders. That is not accumulation for its own sake. It is a balance-sheet simplification funded by selling shares, and it only works while the shares fetch more than the bitcoin behind them. That is the mechanism the whole digital-asset-treasury sector runs on. If the equity trades above the value of the coins it holds, every share issued buys more coin per existing share, and the ratio improves. The premium justifies the issuance and the issuance justifies the premium. When the premium goes, the flywheel does not slow down — it reverses, because issuing shares below asset value destroys the ratio and the only remaining lever is selling coin. Right now the equities are outrunning the asset again. Bitcoin is up 22.8% over twenty days but down 3.0% over five and 0.9% on the day. Strategy is up 40.2% over twenty days and 8.4% over five. BitMine is up 45.6% over twenty days and sits 1.0% below its high; SharpLink is up 39.1%. Coinbase is up 28.4% and within 1.4% of its high. The treasury companies are being valued as leveraged bets on a coin that has stopped rising this week. That gap is the thing to watch, not the coin.

Signs of the times

Stuff you wouldn’t have believed was possible until 2026.

Long bonds expensive for a whole year

The 30-year Treasury yield has closed above 5% on 55 separate days since January, the most in any year since 2006, and peaked at 5.34% in mid-August. The last time the government's longest borrowing cost stayed this high this long, the housing bubble had not yet popped.

ratessupplyterm premium

1 SepBloomberg

Abu Dhabi's spy chief owns half a dollar issuer

Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed, the UAE's national security adviser, and co-investors hold 49% of the holding company of a US bank that has received preliminary approval to issue USD1, the dollar stablecoin launched by the Trump-family-co-founded World Liberty Financial. His conglomerate separately moved $30m in a dirham-backed stablecoin, said to be one of the largest single stablecoin transfers in the Middle East.

stablecoinssovereign moneypolitics

31 AugSemafor

Nebius is pledging its customer contracts

Nebius has upsized its debt raise to $5bn, closed $5.75bn of convertible notes, and begun collateralising both its infrastructure and its customer contracts for further borrowing — against a capex target of up to $25bn this year. In July it borrowed $775m secured on existing GPUs and the cash flows from a single investment-grade customer.

neocloudscollateralcapex

31 AugWeb sweep on AI capex

Eight hundred and fifty percent, five years

In the letter warning G20 ministers that AI leverage could amplify a market correction, the Bank of England's governor cited Nvidia: worth more than $5.2tn, share price up 850% over five years, and now at the centre of a $500bn financing arrangement with US banks and investors that different outlets describe in materially different ways.

concentrationvaluationregulators

31 AugThe Telegraph

The rumour mill

What the crash-callers are saying, checked against real reporting.

Partly true

“Roughly 15 gigawatts of AI chips produced next year will not be able to be switched on because of shortages of power and other data-centre equipment.”

Musk did post on 29 August that consensus is ~15GW of AI compute produced in 2027 cannot be turned on in 2027, citing transformers, wiring, liquid cooling, chillers and networking rather than generation alone. It is his characterisation of a consensus estimate, not a published forecast — but if it is even directionally right, a large slug of GPU capex will sit in crates earning nothing while the debt against it accrues.

Claimed by Meet Kevin

Confirmed

“The BLS published preliminary benchmark revisions marking total payrolls down 79,000 for the year to March, with private payrolls down 178,000 and government up 99,000.”

The figures match the BLS release of 28 August exactly. The composition is the interesting part: private-sector job creation over the year was overstated by 178,000 while public-sector hiring was understated by 99,000.

Claimed by Kitco NEWS

Unsupported

“The 96GB Nvidia RTX 6000 sells for about $15,000 against an $11,000 list price, a 36% premium.”

The specific numbers do not check out, and the claim conflates two different cards. What the fact-check did establish is arguably more striking: the RTX PRO 6000 Blackwell 96GB is listed at $16,000 on Nvidia's own marketplace, against $8,565 at launch and $13,250 in June.

Claimed by Meet Kevin

Earlier developments

Dispatches from previous readings. The same argument, no longer the news.

Private credit and BDCs31 Augmedium

Marked at 64 cents, still called performing

The income these listed private-lending funds report is being sustained by loans their own managers value in the sixties. That means the dividend is a lagging indicator of the portfolio's actual health.

Two loans in the listed private-lending universe are worth looking at closely. Cornerstone OnDemand and Symplr are carried in the mid-60s (63 to 65 cents on the dollar) and neither one has been flagged as a loan where the lender has stopped counting the interest, because it stopped arriving (Accelerate Shares, via web sweep). That combination is the mechanism worth understanding. A mark is a valuation: what the manager thinks the loan is worth today. Deciding to stop booking interest is a separate accounting decision, a judgment that the money is no longer expected to show up. The two can diverge, and right now they are diverging. A loan marked at 64 is a loan the manager believes will lose a third of its principal, and it can still be feeding full contractual interest into net investment income, the number from which the dividend is paid. If that interest is being paid by adding to the debt rather than handing over cash, no money arrives at all; the borrower just hands over more paper. The share of loans paid that way has gone from roughly 6% in early 2022 to about 10% in early 2026 (Blue Vault, same sweep). The aggregate picture is consistent. Across 83 funds, $2.04 billion of investments were written down last quarter, the largest quarterly write-down in the thirteen quarters that dataset covers. Loans where the lender has stopped counting interest at the ten largest funds reached 3.95% of debt at cost, up from 3.75%. The published figures do not agree with each other, and you should know why: some are struck at cost, some at the manager's current valuation, some are medians of a small machine-readable subset. Morningstar DBRS has the average at 3.4%; another panel puts the median at 0.8% of current valuation. The direction is the same everywhere. Meanwhile Ares Capital is up 4.6% over twenty days, FS KKR 11.8%, Blackstone Secured Lending 6.1%. The market is reading these disclosures and buying.

The AI capex bubble31 Augmedium

Broadcom wants up to $100 billion to finance its own buyers

The circular financing of the AI buildout is migrating from chip sellers' own books to private lending funds, where the loan is nobody's disclosed exposure.

A Broadcom-backed financing vehicle was in talks on August 20 to raise $70 billion to $80 billion of debt, with the full structure potentially reaching $100 billion, to fund chip purchases by AI companies including Anthropic (web sweep). In June, Broadcom partnered with Apollo and Blackstone on an AI-infrastructure funding platform, and CNBC reports it is going to the bond market for more money to finance chip purchases. This is the second such structure we have written about in a week. Nvidia has partnered with Wall Street firms to mobilize $500 billion of third-party capital for AI infrastructure. The pattern is the same and it is old: vendor financing. The seller arranges the money the buyer uses to buy the seller's product. Revenue is booked immediately and in full; the credit risk sits somewhere else. The interesting part is where else. In the classic version (Lucent and Nortel in 1999) the chip seller lent the money itself, so the amount owed sat on the seller's own books where an auditor and a stock analyst could see it. Here the lender of record is a private-credit manager and, behind it, an insurance company's investment portfolio. Broadcom's accounts will show a chip sale. Apollo's and Blackstone's funds will show a loan against equipment and contracts. Nowhere in either set of statements does the phrase "we financed our own customer" appear. What we do not know: the structure. This is a talks-stage figure reaching us at second hand, and the terms (who has recourse, what secures the loan, who eats the first loss) are not in anything we have seen. That matters more than the headline number. Apollo trades up 6% over twenty days; Blackstone 6.4%.

Hidden leverage and shadow banking31 Augmedium

The SEC is asking banks what they knew about 4x borrowed money

When a hedge fund borrows from several banks at once, no single bank sees the total. The only time anyone measures the aggregate is after a fund has almost failed.

On August 24, Reuters reported that the SEC, the agency that polices American markets, has sent subpoenas to Wall Street banks that dealt with the hedge fund Situational Awareness, seeking information about the fund's trades and its use of borrowed money after its near-collapse last month. Other coverage puts the fund's total exposure at roughly four times the money it actually had (web sweep). Read the specific ask. The subpoenas seek the fund's communications with lenders about the leverage it was taking on. That is not a question about whether the trades were legal. It is a question about whether each bank knew what the others were doing. This is the structural hole in how hedge funds borrow, and it has not been fixed. A fund borrows against its positions from several banks at once. Each bank sees its own book, prices its own requirements for collateral, and is comfortable. None of them sees the total. The fund's total gross exposure is a number that exists only inside the fund. When the position turns, every lender discovers the same thing at the same moment, and they all try to sell the same collateral. The Reserve Bank of Australia's governor put the general version of this plainly on August 27, talking about private lending funds: "People don't know where the leverage is." Goldman Sachs is down 1% over five days, Morgan Stanley 0.3%. The banks that lend to hedge funds are not being priced as if anyone lost money here, and on the evidence available nobody did. The fund nearly collapsed and did not. That is the honest read: a near miss, followed by a regulator trying to find out how near.

The dollar, gold and reserve status31 Augmedium

Australia's central bank cut its dollars to 45%

When a central bank shifts its reserves away from the dollar, it arrives as a press release rather than a price move, which is why it is easy to underweight.

The Reserve Bank of Australia, the country's central bank, has disclosed that it reduced the US dollar share of its foreign reserve portfolio to 45% from 55%, raising the euro to 30% from 20% (web sweep). Deutsche Bank called it a quiet reduction. Ten percentage points is a large move by the standards of an institution that publishes its allocation once a year and changes it roughly never. Central bank reserve managers are not traders. They set a target, they are slow, and the decision is made by a committee that writes it down. So this is not a market signal in the way a currency move is. It is a stated intention, which is in some respects more durable. Set against the trend: a Kansas City Fed working paper puts the dollar's share of global foreign-exchange reserves at 57% in the first quarter of 2026, down from 72% in 2000. That is about half a point a year. The same body of research makes a point worth holding on to: the euro has captured essentially none of the dollar's lost share globally. Roughly a quarter went to major Asian currencies and three-quarters to non-traditional reserve currencies. Australia is doing something unusual by going to euros. Meanwhile India's reserves hit a record $729.33 billion in the week to August 21, with gold up $2.801 billion to $114.218 billion. The price tape does not corroborate any of this as an emergency. The dollar index, which tracks the dollar against a basket of other currencies, is at 99.5, down 0.2% over twenty days. Gold is up 5.7% over twenty days to $4,488 and down 3.2% over five. What is happening is a slow, announced reallocation, not a run.

Crypto and TradFi contagion31 Auglow

A bitcoin-backed mortgage and a government money-market token as collateral

Crypto is being plumbed into mortgage collateral and fund margin at the same moment its listed wrappers are trading at a widening premium to the assets they hold.

Two things happened in the same week and they run in opposite directions. Coinbase and Better launched bitcoin-backed mortgages, with a waitlist projecting more than $260 million of demand. And Franklin Templeton got SEC clearance to use its $2.6 billion tokenized money-market fund, BENJI, inside ETFs and mutual funds and as collateral pledged to lenders (web sweep). The first is crypto entering the real-economy collateral chain. The mismatch to think about: a 30-year fixed obligation on a house, secured by an asset that trades 24 hours a day and has moved 24.6% in twenty days. Every crypto-backed loan needs a maintenance margin and a trigger at which the lender sells. Nobody has yet run that machinery through a weekend crash at scale with houses on the other side. The filings we have seen do not say what the loan-to-value ratio or the cure period is. The second is the reverse: government money-market exposure being wrapped so it can move instantly and be pledged as collateral. Circle, the company behind the USDC stablecoin (a digital token meant to be worth exactly one dollar), minted about 5 billion USDC in a week. JPMorgan's Kinexys, with Ripple, Mastercard and Ondo, redeemed a tokenized US government bond fund cross-border in under five seconds. Speed is the feature and also the risk. The friction being removed is the same friction that gives a fund manager time to sell assets in an orderly way when investors all want their money back at once. The stock market's verdict is unambiguous. Over twenty days Strategy is up 40.2%, Bitmine 45.6%, SharpLink 39.1%, Coinbase 28.4%, against bitcoin's 24.6%. The companies that hold bitcoin using borrowed money are re-rating faster than the coin they hold, which is what happens when the premium to the value of the underlying assets expands.

Bond market dysfunction31 Augmedium

Washington bought yen in August. It is not holding.

The largest foreign owner of US government bonds has a domestic alternative paying 2.95% for the first time in thirty years, and a currency its own government cannot hold up.

The interest rate on the benchmark Japanese government bond touched 2.95% on Monday, a 30-year high, and the yen weakened again after markets read Kevin Warsh's Jackson Hole remarks as leaving the door open to further rate hikes (Nikkei). The context is what makes this worth a paragraph. In early August the US Treasury Department, which borrows the money the government spends, joined Japan's Ministry of Finance in buying yen, the first joint intervention since 2011, and the first time since 1998 that Washington had bought yen alongside Tokyo. It worked, briefly: the yen went from around 164 to the dollar in late July to around 158. Bessent framed the action as driven by financial stability concerns rather than trade (Reuters column, via Astro Awani). The plumbing is this. Japanese institutions own an enormous stock of foreign bonds, much of it American. Two things determine whether they keep it: the gap between what they earn abroad and what they earn at home, and the currency. A US 10-year bond at 4.73% against a Japanese government bond at 2.95% still favors going abroad, until you pay to insure against the currency moving, at which point the gap can vanish. If the yen falls further, unhedged holders face losses and hedging costs rise; if Japanese bond yields keep climbing, staying home starts to pay. Either route ends in Japanese money selling foreign bonds. Intervention cannot change the yield gap. It can only buy time for policy to. On the tape, the yen ETF is down 1.9% over twenty days: the market has taken back most of what the intervention bought. This is the slow-moving version of a funding shock, and it is not close to one yet.

Private credit and BDCs31 Augmedium

A $2.4bn loan secured on chips

Private credit is moving from lending against a company's earnings to lending against hardware that loses value every year, and nobody has a market price for the collateral.

Iren, a bitcoin miner that rebuilt itself as an AI data-center operator, has raised $2.4bn of debt to buy Nvidia's latest processors for a campus in Canada. The package splits evenly: a $1.2bn senior loan and $1.2bn of senior notes, both secured against the company's assets. One account of the deal says Blue Owl, one of the largest private lenders, led it. This is the merger of our two most-watched stories. Private credit's pitch has always been that it lends against businesses with cash flows, at interest rates that float with the market, on promises it negotiates itself. Lending against a fleet of processors is a different exercise. The collateral is hardware whose resale value depends entirely on how quickly the next generation arrives and on whether the customer paying for the computing power is still there in three years. There is no observable secondhand price for a used rack of these chips. The lender's valuation will be a model, not a real market price. The reporting does not give the percentage of the chips' value the lender is willing to advance, the length of the loan, or what exactly sits inside the security package: chips, the campus, the customer contracts, or all three. Nebius has been doing the adjacent thing openly, pledging infrastructure and customer contracts as security, and in July borrowed $775m against existing processors and the cash flows from one highly rated customer. Meanwhile the same week produced Jefferies' count of loans where the lender has stopped counting the interest because it stopped arriving, at the big listed funds that borrow money, lend it to mid-sized private companies, and pass the interest to shareholders. Those non-paying loans are at their highest since at least 2021: Blackstone Secured Lending at 3.6% against 0.3% a year and a bit ago, Golub 2.9%, Blue Owl 2.8%, Ares 2.4%. The stock market does not care. Blue Owl's management company is up 11.7% over twenty days, its lending fund up 4.9%, FS KKR up 11.8%. Rising bad loans and a rising share price can both be right, but only if you think the new loans are better than the old ones.

Hidden leverage and shadow banking31 Augmedium

The basis trade is $830bn and less of it runs through a central clearinghouse

The largest bet built on borrowed money in the US government bond market is growing while the share of it financed through a central clearinghouse is shrinking.

Analyst estimates circulating this week put the cash-futures basis trade in US government bonds at about $830bn, close to double its early-2020 peak, with a further $305bn in related bets, financed by roughly $3tn of cash borrowed overnight against bonds put up as security, more than twice the level of early 2023. Hedge funds' total government-bond exposure is put at $4tn ($2.4tn of bets that prices will rise, $1.6tn that they will fall), around 8.5% of all outstanding US government bonds, with about 90% of the borrowing sitting in the fifty largest funds. The trade itself is simple. Government bond futures usually trade a little above the price of the underlying bond because leveraged buyers want exposure without funding it. A hedge fund buys the bond, sells the future, and collects the difference. The gap is a few hundredths of a percentage point, so the trade only pays at enormous size, which means enormous overnight borrowing against the bonds. It works until the lender demands more security for that borrowing, at which point the fund must post cash it does not have and sells the bond, into a market that is already falling. The number to watch is not the size but the plumbing. One market note says overnight borrowing that runs through a central clearinghouse (where margin is set by rule) fell from 71% of the market at end-2025 to 62% in the first quarter of 2026. The rest is arranged privately between two firms, with the lender setting the terms by judgment, at the exact moment judgment is worst. A rising private share means more of this borrowed money is financed on terms nobody outside the two firms can see. All of this is analyst commentary, not official data: no release from the Bank for International Settlements (the central bankers' own bank), the IMF (which lends to countries in trouble), or the Federal Reserve (America's central bank) in the window. What is official: the SEC, the agency that polices American markets, has subpoenaed banks over the near-collapsed fund Situational Awareness, seeking its communications with lenders about the borrowed money it was taking on.

The AI capex bubble31 Aughigh

The FSB chair writes to the G20 about Nvidia

The body that coordinates global financial regulation has now named AI-related borrowing as a risk to the whole system, which tells you it is large and tells you nobody has a tool for it.

Andrew Bailey, in his twice-yearly letter to G20 finance ministers written as chair of the Financial Stability Board (the body that coordinates global financial regulation), says the debt used to fund the AI build-out "could amplify a future market correction." The framing is the important part: "The issue is not simply that investors are borrowing more but that leverage is interacting with high valuations and market concentration." The Telegraph's accompanying numbers give it scale. Nvidia is worth more than $5.2tn, its shares are up 850% in five years, and it recently raised $500bn from a group of US banks and investors to fund its AI investment program. Set that beside CNBC's reporting that some of the largest cloud companies have pushed capital spending above 100% of operating cash flow, meaning the next data center is not funded by the business, it is funded by somebody's balance sheet (the list of what they own and owe), and CoreWeave finishing the second quarter with around $35bn of debt. What has changed here is what officials are willing to say, not what is standing in the system. A letter to the G20 does not alter a single capital requirement, a single lease, or a single promise in a loan contract. The Financial Stability Board has no ability to make a bank hold more capital against a loan secured on processors. Bailey is describing risk that was already built, in the same week that JPMorgan was shopping $5bn of debt for a company valued at $2.4bn three weeks earlier and Nebius closed $5.75bn of convertible bonds. One item we cannot confirm and flag as such: a single report says a Broadcom-backed vehicle was in talks on August 20 to raise $70bn to $80bn for a chip-financing arrangement supporting AI companies including Anthropic, with a total possibly near $100bn. One outlet. Treat it as unconfirmed until it is not.

Fed, Treasury and policy31 Aughigh

Treasury may buy its own long bonds with its own cash

The government is becoming a buyer of its own long-dated debt, funded by its cash balance, which changes both the structure of the debt and how honestly the interest rate reflects what investors think.

From September 9 to November 4, the Treasury Department (which borrows the money the government spends) will double the maximum size of its buybacks of government IOUs that do not come due for ten to thirty years, from $2bn to at least $4bn per operation. Scott Bessent said the market for thirty-year bonds was "especially poor" and called the program a kind of "Treasury twist." The announcement followed the interest rate the government pays to borrow for thirty years touching about 5.34%, a nineteen-year high; that rate fell within minutes and had round-tripped by the following afternoon. The mechanism deserves attention. A buyback is the Treasury purchasing its own outstanding long-dated bonds in the secondary market. Someone has to pay for them. Officials have signaled that the Treasury General Account, the government's cash balance at the Federal Reserve (America's central bank, which sets interest rates), about $940bn on August 19 and near $1tn, could be used. Run down the cash pile, or replace the retired long bonds with short-term bills, and you have shortened the length of debt the public holds. That is precisely what Operation Twist did in 2011. The difference is that this is the borrower doing it, not the central bank, and the borrower has an obvious interest in the price of its own debt. Two consequences. First, financing with short-term bills makes the $40tn debt stock more sensitive to short-term interest rates, awkward when futures are pricing better-than-even odds of a rate increase on September 16. Second, once there is a discretionary official buyer in the long end of the market, the thirty-year interest rate becomes a slightly less honest reading of what investors think of the country's fiscal path. What this is not: dysfunction. No failed auctions, no dealer balance-sheet seizure, no forced selling. This is price stress and a policy response to it, which is a different, and earlier, stage.

Crypto and TradFi contagion31 Aughigh

Strategy sold $603m of stock to buy $370m of bitcoin

The treasury-company model feeds on itself in both directions, and it has just restarted on the upswing.

Strategy has resumed buying bitcoin after a ten-week pause, purchasing $369.7m of the tokens in the week ended August 30. To fund it, the company raised $602.8m through the sale of common stock, and used part of the difference to buy back $151.8m of its own preferred shares. The second half of that sentence is the interesting one. The digital-asset treasury model only works while the shares trade above the value of the coins the company holds. If they do, issuing stock and buying coin adds coin per share, and the loop feeds itself. If they do not, issuing stock destroys value for existing holders and the loop stops, which is roughly what the ten-week pause looked like, after what Bloomberg describes as a crypto downturn that pressured the shares, weakened confidence in the financing model and prompted a balance-sheet overhaul. Buying back preferred stock with common-equity proceeds is a move to reduce fixed obligations in the middle of a move to add borrowed exposure. Preferred shares sit ahead of common and carry a fixed cost that has to be paid whatever bitcoin does; buying them back shrinks that fixed claim. That the company chose to spend a quarter of its raise doing that, rather than buying more coin, is a statement about what that preferred was costing. The prices say the loop is running again. Over twenty days Strategy is up 40%, BitMine up 46%, SharpLink up 39%, Coinbase up 28%, against bitcoin up 23% and, at $78,289, down slightly on the day. The company wrappers are outrunning the asset itself by fifteen to twenty points. That is what borrowed exposure to a rising coin looks like. It is also what it looks like on the way back down.

Household credit31 Aughigh

The average credit score is 714. The bottom band is falling

Consumer stress is concentrating in the lowest credit-score band while the average looks stable, which is exactly how the average stops looking stable.

The average American FICO score (the number lenders use to decide whether to lend to you and at what rate) is unchanged at 714. Underneath it, about 3.2 million consumers with a student loan payment due were reported behind on payments, and that group lost an average of 38 points year on year. Consistent payers gained 6 points. Borrowers with no recent missed payments gained 16. A 38-point drop is not a statistic, it is a repricing. It moves a borrower across the boundaries that lenders use mechanically: the car-loan rate, the credit-card limit, the mortgage overlay, the insurance quote in states that use scores. Someone who missed student loan payments in 2026 pays more for everything else they borrow in 2027, which makes the next missed payment more likely. FICO's own follow-up data shows the pattern: subsequent severe delinquency on mortgages and car loans rose only in the lowest score bands and was flat across higher ranges. The rest of the household picture is a clean split. Credit cards are healing: bank delinquency of thirty or more days at 2.85%, down from 3.04% a year earlier. Car loans are not. Fitch (one of the three firms that grade how likely a borrower is to pay you back) has subprime car-loan delinquency at 6.13% in July against 5.80% at midyear, prime at 0.49%; Equifax, summarizing Moody's, calls subprime car-loan delinquency an all-time high; one in eighteen car-loan balances was three or more months late in the second quarter (5.49%, per the New York Fed). The market disagrees, and specifically. Credit Acceptance, the deep-subprime car lender, is up 5.1% over twenty days and sits 0.4% below its recent high. Its borrowers are at a record delinquency rate. Both can be true: deep-subprime lenders price for losses and often earn more when competitors retreat. But the stock is not carrying any doubt at all.

Fed, Treasury and policy31 Aughigh

The two ends of the curve now have different owners

A rate rise now transmits fastest to exactly the floating-rate private-credit borrowers whose non-accruals are already at post-2021 highs.

Two weeks before the 16 September FOMC, the market has flipped. Before Kevin Warsh spoke at Jackson Hole on 28 August, futures priced roughly a 36% chance of a quarter-point hike; afterwards, between 56% and 60% depending on which contract you read. MarketWatch put it at 57.4% against 35.9%; Forbes at 58% against 36%. Warsh's line, as reported, was that "two percent is a firm and fixed target" and that "short-term interest rates are the primary tool". This was already the internal direction of travel. Three FOMC members dissented in favour of a hike in July, when the rate was held at 3.50–3.75% for a fifth straight meeting, and four of the twelve Reserve Banks voted to raise the discount rate. Now put that next to the other arm of the state. From 9 September through 4 November, the Treasury will buy back at least $4bn of 10–30 year debt per operation, double the previous cap. Bessent called long-bond liquidity "especially poor" and the programme a "Treasury twist" (Guardian). So the Fed may push the front end up while the Treasury leans on the long end from below. The 2-year is already at 4.34%, up 7bp on the week; 2s10s is 39bp. A flattening curve driven by policy in both directions is not an academic problem for anyone funding floating-rate assets. Every direct loan in a BDC portfolio is priced off SOFR, currently 3.65%. Borrowers already generating 3.95% non-accruals at the ten largest BDCs would pay 25bp more, immediately.

The AI capex bubble30 Augmedium

The chips arrive. The transformers do not.

Power assets falling while everyone insists power is the bottleneck is the clearest price-versus-narrative disagreement in the AI complex right now.

Elon Musk posted on 29 August that the "consensus estimate is that ~15GW of AI compute produced in 2027 cannot be turned on in 2027", and that the binding constraint is not electricity as such but "transformers, wiring, liquid-cooling, (massive) chillers & complex networking". The Information separately reported that developers working with Google, Microsoft and Oracle fear chips with nowhere to plug in. Both are claims rather than audited facts, and we have marked them as such. The scale is not in dispute. At Piketon, Ohio, OpenAI intends to lease eight gigawatts from SoftBank, which plans to spend up to $500bn and build more than nine gigawatts of new gas generation in the region (n-tv). Here is the part that does not fit. If power and power equipment are the scarce input, the companies that own generation should be repricing upward. They are doing the opposite. Talen Energy is down 14.1% over twenty days and sits 22% below its recent high. Vistra is down 11.9% and 18.7% off. Applied Digital, which builds on project debt, is down 13.8%; Core Scientific is down 28.5% and a third off its high. Two readings are available. Either the equity market has decided the scarcity rent is already in the PPAs and the upside accrues to the tenant, not the landlord — or it has quietly stopped believing that all the announced load will actually show up. The second reading is the one that matters for anyone lending against a twenty-year lease.

Private credit and BDCs31 Augmedium

A loan marked at 63 cents that is still performing

A loan that pays interest in more loan can stay 'performing' well past the point where the mark says the lender is impaired.

Two names to hold on to: Cornerstone OnDemand and Symplr. Both are marked in the 63–65 cent range in BDC portfolios. Neither is on non-accrual. That is not necessarily an abuse. A loan goes on non-accrual when the lender stops expecting to collect interest. A loan can be marked at 63 because the market for that credit is thin and the exit is uncertain, while the borrower still pays. But there is a mechanism that makes the distinction slippery, and it is growing. Payment-in-kind lets a borrower settle interest by issuing more debt rather than sending cash. The share of BDC loans using PIK has risen from about 6% in early 2022 to roughly 10% by early 2026, according to Blue Vault; a separate count puts PIK loans at about 16% of total investments at listed BDCs, with five funds holding three-quarters of it. The two figures do not reconcile and we cannot reconcile them — they are almost certainly measuring different things (loans with any PIK feature versus PIK-only), and nobody publishes a clean series. Apollo says PIK yields in listed BDCs have started to rise, driven by software-sector stress. That is the same sector as Cornerstone and Symplr. Meanwhile the arithmetic underneath keeps moving: non-accruals at the ten largest BDCs reached 3.95% of debt at cost in Q2, and across 83 funds $2.04bn was written down — the largest quarterly write-down in the thirteen quarters of data available. The shares do not care. FS KKR is up 11.8% over twenty days, Blue Owl's manager up 11.7%, Blackstone Secured Lending sits 0.1% off its high.

Household credit31 Aughigh

Cards are getting better. Cars are at a record.

Aggregate household credit numbers are being held up by prime borrowers while the bottom band records all-time-high auto delinquency — averages will keep looking calm until they suddenly don't.

The household data this week splits cleanly in two, and the split is the story. Getting worse: Fitch reports subprime auto delinquencies at 6.13% in July, up from 5.80% at midyear. The New York Fed's Q2 data show 5.5% of all US auto debt at least 90 days past due — the second-highest reading in more than twenty years. Equifax, summarising Moody's, says subprime borrowers are at an all-time high for auto delinquency. On student loans, FICO counts about 3.2 million consumers with a recent delinquency — 15% of those with a payment due — carrying an average 38-point year-on-year score decline. ATTOM's mid-year report, which we have fact-checked as confirmed, counted 227,548 properties with foreclosure filings in the first half of 2026, up 21% year on year, with activity rising in 77% of metro areas. Getting better: 30-day-plus credit card delinquency fell to 2.85% in Q2 from 3.04% a year earlier, and Equifax's 60-day measure fell to 2.69% from 2.87%. Prime auto delinquency is 0.49%. Early-stage mortgage delinquency eased to 1.35%. The average FICO score is unchanged at 714. FICO's own cut of the data is the sharpest version: 90-day-plus delinquency on mortgages and autos rose only in the lowest score bands, and was flat everywhere else. This is not a deteriorating consumer. It is a consumer splitting into two populations, one of which is fine. Credit Acceptance, which lends at the deepest subprime end, trades 0.72% off its high and up 5.1% in twenty days. Equity holders have concluded that lending to distressed borrowers at those rates is a good business, and so far this cycle they have been right.

Crypto and TradFi contagion31 Augmedium

Bitcoin is being moved indoors, one wrapper at a time

Crypto only becomes a systemic problem when it is collateral inside regulated balance sheets, and that is precisely what was built this week.

BlackRock processed more than $5bn of direct bitcoin-into-ETF conversions after cutting the minimum ticket from $25m to $1m. Circle minted roughly 5bn USDC in a single week. Franklin Templeton received SEC clearance to use its $2.6bn tokenised BENJI money-market fund inside ETFs and mutual funds — and as collateral. JPMorgan's Kinexys, with Ripple, Mastercard and Ondo, settled a cross-border redemption of a tokenised Treasury fund in under five seconds. Each of these is presented as plumbing, and each is. But taken together they describe a specific migration: coins that used to sit in self-custody, outside the regulated system, are being converted into share classes held in brokerage accounts, and tokenised fund units are being made eligible as collateral. That is how an asset with 40% annual drawdowns acquires the ability to trigger a margin call somewhere that matters. The direction of travel is visible in price. Bitcoin is at $78,952, up 24.2% in twenty days. Strategy is up 40.2%, BitMine up 45.6%, SharpLink up 39.1%, Coinbase up 28.4% — all within about 3% of their recent highs. Three months ago the digital-asset treasury model was described as broken; Strategy had stopped buying for ten weeks. It has now bought $369.7m of bitcoin funded by $602.8m of common stock sales, and used $151.8m to buy back preferred (Bloomberg). The equity issuance machine works again. That is the whole model: it functions when the shares trade above the coins, and stops when they don't.

The dollar, gold and reserve status30 Aughigh

Australia's central bank cut its dollars from 55% to 45%

Reserve diversification is slow enough to ignore for years and then determines who has to absorb the long end when it matters.

The Reserve Bank of Australia disclosed that during 2025 it reduced the target US dollar share of its foreign reserves from 55% to 45%, raising the euro from 20% to 30%. Deutsche Bank called it a quiet reduction. It is ten percentage points from one mid-sized reserve manager, which is not a systemic event on its own — but it is a decision taken deliberately, disclosed after the fact, and of a kind that other reserve managers make by watching each other. The broader series is undramatic and relentless: the dollar's share of global FX reserves has slipped from a little over 70% at the turn of the century to a little under 60%, roughly half a point a year. Notably, the euro has captured none of that — Asian major currencies took about a quarter and non-traditional reserve currencies about three-quarters. Gold is the other side of the same trade. India's reserves hit a record $729.3bn, with gold holdings up $2.801bn to $114.218bn in the week to 21 August. Spot gold rose 10% in August, its biggest monthly gain since January, before giving back 3.1% over the past five sessions once Warsh committed to fighting inflation (Bloomberg). Connect this to the bond desk. Half a point a year of reserve share is a slow withdrawal of the least price-sensitive buyer of long-dated Treasuries. When that buyer steps back and the deficit runs near 6% of GDP against $40tn of debt, the marginal purchaser of the 30-year becomes someone who demands compensation. Which is roughly why the Treasury is now buying its own bonds back.

What would change our mind

The specific, observable things that would move the number - in either direction.

A redemption gate at a US non-traded BDC or interval fund — the Australian restrictions have not yet crossed the Pacific, and that crossing would move ignition several points at once.

Would move the number

High yield spreads through 320bp, or the BDC complex breaking below its twenty-day range while credit indices hold — either would mean the price is finally asking the question the non-accrual data poses.

Would move the number

A failed or badly tailed long-dated Treasury auction, or evidence of margin-driven selling out of the basis trade; the buyback programme starting 9 September is the first test of whether the patch holds.

Would move the number

A clear, sourced statement of what Nvidia's $500bn actually is — its own borrowing or third-party capital it has arranged — which would settle whether the vendor or its customers carry the AI credit risk.

Would move the number